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RE8PONDENT'S 8'TATEMENT OF' 
THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
As stated by the Plaintiff-Appellant, this is an actiou 1 
for divorce, including the division of property. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COUR'l' 
The trial court entered a Decree of Divorce on th( 
15th day of July, 1966, granting the Plaintiff a divorce
1 
and in essence directing that the property accumulatea 
by the parties during their marriage be liquidated to 
pay the debts insofar as possible, and ordering that the 
net assets, both real and personal, accumulated durini 
the marriage and owned by the parties on November 2o, 
1965 be distributed, one-third to the Plaintiff-Appellant 
and two-thirds to the Defendant-Respondent, the value 
of said assets to be figured as of the date of division. In 
addition, the Plaintiff-Appellant was awarded the sum of 
$200.00 per month as alimony and $900.00 attorney's feei. 
From this decree the Plaintiff has appealed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiff-Appellant is seeking to have the Decree 
of Divorce modified on the question of the division of the 
d ht d bligatwn
1 
real and p~m:>onal property after the e s an o 
have been paid. 
3 
lD1£NT1FlCA'l'lON OF 'l\HE PARTIES 
AND EXPLANA'rION OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Melva S. Anden;on i8 the Plaintiff and Appellant. 
Bianl K Anderson is the Defendant and Respondent. For 
pnwtical pnrpo8e8 l\lelva S. Anderson is sometimes re-
ferred to by her own name or as the Plaintiff and Biard 
E. Anderson is sometimes ref erred to by his own name 
or as the D<•f endant. The foregoing is consistent with the 
A1Jpcllant ':,; identification of the parties. 
"R ___ " refers to a page reference in the re.cord of 
tlw case. 
RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
B.v way of 8Upplementing and in some instances cor-
recting- the Plaintiff's STATEMENT OF F:&CTS, the 
following statement is submitted: 
'!'he Plaintiff has never made any financial contribu-
tion to the marriage until she started conducting bus tours 
approximately two years ago (R. 62, 179). She works for 
an engineer (R. 5-i) and is capable in her work (R. 59). 
~liP g·pnerall:v works forty hours per week and earns $1.85 
Jwr liom ( R. Gl), resulting in an average monthly income 
of $320.00 per month. She holds up well in her work (R. 
1 ~i) and i~ wr~, eapable in doing her particular work 
1 I( 5G, fl7). 
+ 




month (R. 18:2). Cornrnencing with ahout 1!-!51or1%~.tJ 1 , 
Defendant involved himsdf in variou::; lmsim·::;s VPntm'"" 
losing on SOllll' and making on other::;, \\'ith a profit n1·1,1 
the last nine years arnounting to roughly $1,000.00 a \1,ai 
(R. 111). His various husinp::;::; n·nhue::; haw not involnil 
his pay check ( R.. 112), \\'hi eh at least sin<'t' lOGU, lil' ha; 
customarily deliven~d to the Plaintiff (R. 81 ). 
By the time of the trial, the· only e(1uity the partm 
really had was their home ( H. 187). Exhibit 1-l: show~ that 
the total liabilities of the parties amounted to $7 J ,.±07.0U 
with a net worth of $10,167.00, based on the sale of tli0 
home at $65,000.00. If the home is not ~old, bankruptey 
is inevitable (R. 1:26, 1:28). Plaintiff's observation on 
page 8 of her brief may well be true: "If we take Exhibit 
14 as bearing out the true facts, it is apparent that then· 
may be no property to divide." 
The Defendant had filed a counterclaim (R. 9). M 
the outset of the trial a 8tipulation was entered into, ll'itli 
a recognition that both parties had grounds for divorce. 
·•rrHE COlTRT: I have read the 11leadingt:. 'J'lwi• 
isn't much then>. T do not know the partiP.~. 
. t· j . I j,; \ 11\1 "You may make \\'hat 01wmng s a. ('lit<' · . 
think an· 111>c·<·ssary. 
5 
".MR. McCULLOUGH: Let me make a brief one. 
"If the Court please, with respect to this matter, 
in view of expediting the question of the divorce, 
particularly with reference to the grounds, Plain-
tiff would be willing to stipulate, and does stipu-
late that both parties in this action have grounds 
for divorce, if they were permitted to testify and 
state the facts upon which based. 
"THE COUR'l1 : ls this stipulation satisfactory as 
far as your client is concerned? 
''MR Mc.MURRAY: That stipulation would be 
agreeable, and in keeping with the feelings of the 
Defendant, and in view of that stipulation on the 
part of the Plaintiff, through her counsel, that the 
Defendant would have grounds if were testifying 
in court, the Defendant is willing to· ·withdraw his 
counterclaim, and permit the Plaintiff to proceed, 
as far as the question of grounds is concerned. 
"If the Court finds that she has sufficient grounds 
for divorce, to grant it in her favor, in view of 
what she has said through her counsel. 
''THE COURT: Without prejudice as to what 
the decision of the property or alimony would be. 
"MR. McMURRA Y: It should be this stipulation 
is made with the understanding that the Court 
thereupon would consider the property matter, and 
that no prejudice whatsoever would result against 
tlw. Defendant, but would eonsider the property 
matter without in any way involving this grounds 
problem. 
6 
"MR McCULLOUU l l: That 1s agreeabl1· if tft, 
Court is agn~eahle to it. 
"THE COUHT: 'L'lw Court frels this is a whoi1 
some method of handling it. 
"'l'he counterclaim is \\·ithdrawn, and )·on 1na: 
proceed, Mr. McCullongh." ( R 53-5-t.) 
Counsel for the Plaintiff oll pages 5 and (j of hi~ hr11f 
seems to infer that the Court was unable to or did not 
follow the stipulation of the parties and out of conte1i 
quotes the trial court. This is most unfair to the court 
and a reading of the record will show (see for example R 
186-188) that Plaintiff's counsel at the trial of the cw. 
repeatedly injected matters into the testimony that \rnl 
to grounds for divorce aftt>r sufficient testimony 11a1J 
been introduced to support her claim for divorce, tb1 
only purpose of which could have been to prejudice th~ 
Court. Nev~leJ;~v1 ... is dear that the trial court wa· 
capable of ~fu~sid<:'ring the problem in harmo111 
with the stipulation of the parties and did in fact do so 
In this regarcl the Court's attention is respectful!:\' in 
vited to Pages 188-191 of the Record. 
SCOPE OF RIDVIl~W 
[n the ('aSf~ of Al/en v. Alfe11, ]()!-)Utah 99, 165 P.2ri 
87:2 ( 1 !l!G) tl1is Court n·vi('\\'l'!l and :-;et fortl1 tlw ~c 11P 1 
of n~viPW in <livon·e Jll'Of'('(•dings: 
7 
"'f'hl'l't' are nurnerous decisions of this court 
l1olding that the Supre11w Court will not substi-
t11t<~ its judgment in a divon~<· proceeding relatiw 
l1l alimony and division of property for that of 
1 lw trial eourt unlPss the record clearly discloses 
that th(• trial court's d<·c·n~(~ in sneh matters is 
plain!.'· arbitrary. 
"W<· lwliPw that the great weight of authority 
,.:upports tlw rule that a decree of the trial court 
in divorl'<> prol'PPdings, relatiw to alimony and 
di,·ision of propPrty, will not be modified except 
\\·Jwn the• trial court has abused its discretion. 
( ltlwn,·isP, thP appPllate court by its own actions 
"·onld altPr the puqrnse for which it was created. 
An aprwllat(:' eonrt cannot rPmain a court of ap-
1wals and invite a review of every case decided 
hr a lmn'r tribunal "·here its judgment fails to 
satisfy on0 or both parties to the litigation." 
f.;('(' also A 11d c rso 11 r. A 11dcrso11, 10-t Utah 104, 138 
1'.2d :.!:-i:.!, :.!:'i-1-; 8te1rnrt r. Steu;.art, liG Utah 3G6, 242 P. 947; 
.lr/r1111sn11 1. Adamsrm, 55 (Ttah 5-±4, 188 P. 635; Pinney 
1 • l'i1111e11. lili taah (i1:2, :2-1-5 P. :129; Bullen v. Bullen, 71 
!"tali r;:i, :2(i:.! P. :292; Blair r. Blair, -±0 Utah 306, 121 P. 
lfJ, ,\nn. Cas. 191-1- D 989, :l8 L.R.A., X.S. :269; Friedli v. 
lri, ,f/1, (;.-, l '1ali ()().'), :.!:)."\ P. Ci-1-7; Pi11i1111 r. Pinion, 92 




THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 1 
AND DID NOT MAKE AN INADEQUATE AWARD OF PROP-
ERTY TO THE PLAINTIFF AND DID PROPERLY CON-
SIDER THE STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES IN REGARD 
TO DIVISION OF PROPERTY. 
The Plaintiff contends that the trial court did not 
follow the stipulation of the parties in distn1bing the 
property. See Point I of Plaintiff's brief. {X.wt;r;_/J.tit;#} 
This contention is not fair to the trial court nor is it 
supported by the record which clearly shows that notwith-
standing the efforts of Plaintiff's counsel to constantly 
bring up matters going· to "blame'' and "grounds" that the 
court was able to and did in fad consider the problem of 
the distribution of property objectively and in the light 
of the Stipulation of the parties ( R. 53-54) and in accord 
ance with well established rules, guide lines and preced 
ents (R. 188-191). 
Counsel cites Wooley v. Wooley, 113 Utah391,195 
P.2d 743 (1948) as a basis for his contention that ~e 
Plaintiff Hhould receivt> 80111ething morP than one-tlnrd 
of tlw property. lt slwuld IH· 110trd however, that in tl11 
9 
\\'11()l<·.'· <·asP, though a stronger ease was presented for 
1 Jw Jrn:-;i>and, both of the parties had grounds for divorce. 
Jt should al:-;o lw nokd that in the ·wooley case no alimony 
11as a\\'ard<·d to the wife while in the instant case the 
J'Jaintiff \ms mrnnled $200.00 per month. Furthermore, 
!hi:- <'onrt point<>d out in the Wooley ease that a one-third 
division of property to thP wife "is a relative amount 
1d11ch 111nst, of neeessit>·, vary with the facts of the par-
ticular case." 
'l'he g<'neral factors recognized as guide lines in ar-
ri,•ing at an <·qnitable result have been referred to in a 
11urnlier of ]H'eviously decided cases. See Foreman v. 
Forc111r111, 111Utah72, 176 P. 2d 144, 152 following Pinion 
1. Pi11ion, supra. 
Jn disposing of the property and providing for the 
support of divorced persons this court in other cases has 
iiPl'n °·uided hv thP "one-third rule" but has consistently I"> • 
n·eog11iz1•<l that this is only a guide line to be varied with 
th" pec:nliar ('ircumstances of each case. For example 
in Ur1//i11 r. Oriffi11, 18 Vtah 98, 55 P. 84 (1898) it was 
li 1·1d tliat thP dissolution of a marriage by divorce being 
a11:d1Jgo11s to its dissolution by dt>atli, a general rule for 
tl 11 • :1110.\1 an,·1· or alimony is the customary one-third of 
10 
the hm;band's property, or one-third of his ineom\'. B ut, 
in Blair v. Blair, supra where the husband's 1noperty 
was worth $40,000.00, an award of $4,500.00 to the wifo 
who was granted the divorce for her lrnsband'R \rillful 
neglect to support her, was held, under the circurn8tanre1, 
not to be so inadequate and inequitable as to justify a 
reversal on the grounds of abuse of discretion. In thl· 
1 
case of Porter v. Porter, 109 Utah -14-!, Hi6 P.2d 516 (1946) 1 
the court modified the decree entered by the trial cou1i 
with the result that the wife who got the divorce, rmived 
less than one-third property of the husband . 
.Many other cases could be cited and are collected by 
the annotator under Section 30-3-5 Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, which cases all support the concept that a one-U1irrl 
distribution of property to a wife in a divorce proceeding 
might be used as a guide line to be varied under the par· 
ticular facts and circumstances involved in the case. Sep 
for example, Bullen v. Bullen, supra and Wooley t'. Wuul. 
ey, supra. 
ln the instant case, the Plaintiff has rnadP practicall1 
no financial contribution to tlw marriage ( H. Ii~. li~ 1 
It is true, of coun;!:', that over the year::; she has 1wrfurn11' 
lu.,r roll as a wifr and mother in a rnarriagt~ that ha~ iwv 
11 
deteriorated rmmlting in divorce. She is employed with 
awrage earnings of $320.00 per month (R. 61) and is in 
good health (R. 63). It was stipulated that both parties 
had grounds for divorce and that the court should make 
rf! distrilndion without prejudice to the Defendant (R. 53-
j.f). The Plaintiff was awarded $200.00 per month as ali-
mony and one-third of the net assets of the estate. 
This court might well note that the Plaintiff is appar-
ently very satisfied with the $200.00 per month alimony 
award as no appeal is being taken from that portion of 
the decree. Though this court is not being called upon 
in this appeal to consider the propriety of the $200.00 
per month alimony award, certainly it should be consider-
ed in determining the sufficiency of the property distri-
bution to the Plaintiff. 
ln the light of all of these circumstances there is no 
basis for a contention that the Plaintiff has been treated 
unfairly or that the trial court has violated any prior 
guide lines established by this court. The decree entered 
by the trial court evidences no abuse of discretion what-
wewr. l<~ven if thiH eourt might have made some other 
dispo~ition of the property of the parties had it been sit-
ting in place of .Judge Jeppson at the trial, there is cer-
tai11l.1· nothing in the record that would 1emotely suggest 
that tlH· deeret> entered was "plainly arbitrary.'' As a 
matter of fact in the light of tltt· alirno11.\· award. Uii· 
property a\vard to the Plaintiff of one-third of thl lli't 
estate, whatever that might turn out to be, was m0ot 
generous. 
POINT II 
THE OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM BUSINESS VEN-
TURES SHOULD NOT BE PAID BY THE DEFENDANT AS 
CONTENDED BY THE PLAINTIFF. 
The contention of the Plaintiff m Point ~ of ht1 
brief is so obviously unfair as to deserve littl!~ <·ommi:nt 
The Plaintiff is here contending that all of the dehts gen 
erated by the business activities of the Defendant ~houlri 
be paid by him and that th<> balance of the estate should 
be divided 50-50. 
The Plaintiff of course over all the vears that th1 ' ' . 
parties have been married has enjoyed the economic bent 
fits made possible through the Defendant's efforts. Sh1 
has had the benefit of his monthly paycheck (R. 81) a; 
well as some gain on his business ventures (R. 111). Sli:· 
married him, we may presume, for "better or \1·m~c. 
Now at the end of the trail together her roncept of fair 
ness st•ems to be: the "better'' for her, the "wor~I'" foi 
him. 
If th j,.., <·ourt wPn" to onkr that a division of tlw 111'111 ' 
el"ty lw 111adt• in <H·rorda1w<· with tlw nrguwe1tt iii fr· 
l'laintiff, the effect would be to plunge the Defendant into 
bankruptcy. 8ee Exhibit 14. An examination of Exhibit 
l + clearl.v demonstrates that this would be the ~~~~ble 
r·p:-:ult. rl'his, of course, does not seem to concerry'Pf!:ttlltiff, 
1101 1:s she concerned with the fact that 0reditors who are 
untitled to be paid will not be paid if she is granted her 
n't{UPst. WP can only be grateful that courts are mo·re 
objedive and considerate of all interests concerned than 
are emotional and impassioned litigants who become blind 
tn dutit•s and obligations. The trial court never lost sight 
uf the fact that creditors were entitled to be considered in 
thi1; pro<:tieding and thus ordered that the assets be liqui-
dult'd and the obligations discharged and thereupon the 
1·state fw divided. Under the decree as entered the credi-
tor~ hav<' an even chance of being paid, both the Plaintiff 
allll Def'rndant may receive a few dollars from the estate 
n"qnired and the Defendant will not be bankrupt. 
SUMMARY 
l 11 «.onelnsion we respectfully submit that the decree 
"
1 lit« lrial (·uurt is already more than generous in favor 
14: 
o.f the Plaintiff. She has her $200.00 per month alimony 
and one-third of the net assets of the parties. The decree 
of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
1 
i/'ut~ ?f,:/v{ ·~ 
MACOY ?McMURRAY j 
of 
McKAY AND BURTON 
Suite 500 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Def endamt-
Respondent 
